

# VANCOUVER YOUTH MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2020



**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**BACKGROUND GUIDE**



## VANCOUVER YOUTH MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2020

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

*Director: Katrina Sun*

*Chair: Noah Wong*

*Assistant Director: Yufei Huang*

*Assistant Chair: Michella O'Brian*

---

Dear delegates,

My name is Katrina Sun and it is my pleasure to be your director of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for VYMUN 2020. As your director, I hope to foster a comprehensive educational experience filled with stimulating debate at VYMUN 2020. This year, we will examine two topics: NATO's Mandate in Afghanistan and Nuclear Arms Control.

Our first topic, NATO's Mandate in Afghanistan, reflects on a longstanding and prevalent issue in the international community. The continual conflict in Afghanistan has stimulated cooperation between member states, beginning from NATO's invocation of Article 5. This is parallel to NATO's founding values of collective security and cohesion between its members. In spite of this, an end to the 40-year war seems highly implausible considering current circumstances. While the United States has signed a deal with the Taliban, its agreement to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan has presented a variety of new challenges for all nations involved. Such challenges include the management of a volatile Afghan government, illicit opium trade, displacement of citizens, incompetent Afghan security forces, and the threat of drone strikes. It is of utmost importance for NATO to determine how to most safely and effectively resolve these issues.

Our second topic, Nuclear Arms Control, is a broad one. Due to NATO's basis as a nuclear alliance, the road towards disarmament brings numerous challenges. With the unpredictable security environment, the United States' withdrawal from the INF Treaty has brought concern over the lessening arms treaties between the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, the slowing of disarmament poses a threat to the efficacy of current regulations, suggesting that certain guidelines are in need of review. Actions by specific countries, namely North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran, have also brought up the question of certain views and morals. All delegates must keep an open mind during this topic, and keep in mind the policies for NATO as a nuclear committee.

If you have any questions or concerns, please don't hesitate to contact me at [nato@vymun.com](mailto:nato@vymun.com). I look forward to seeing everyone in October.

Sincerely,

Katrina Sun  
Director of NATO | VYMUN 2020

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## **TOPIC A: NATO's Mandate in Afghanistan**

Questions to Consider	4
Overview	4
Timeline	5
Historical Analysis	7
Past Action	11
Current Situation	13
Possible Solutions	15
Bloc Positions	17
Sources Cited	19

## **TOPIC B: Nuclear Arms Control**

Questions to Consider	21
Overview	21
Timeline	22
Historical Analysis	24
Past Action	26
Current Situation	27
Possible Solutions	30
Bloc Positions	31
Sources Cited	33

# NATO's Mandate in Afghanistan

## Questions to Consider

1. How can we address concerns about the fate of Afghan women and children?
2. How can we prevent the displacement of Afghan civilians contributing to the European Migrant Crisis?
3. How can we ensure the smooth transition of a budgetary takeover of military forces between NATO and the Government of Afghanistan?
4. How can we ensure verifiable enforcement mechanisms in post-negotiation scenarios?
5. How will we determine the criteria for carrying out drone strikes?

## Overview

After the Taliban government refused to hand over terrorist leader Osama bin Laden after Al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership rapidly lost authority and thus relocated to southern Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since then, they have waged an insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul, NATO troops, and the Afghan security forces.<sup>1</sup> NATO member countries have been engaged militarily in Afghanistan under a United Nations mandate in order to prevent the country from becoming a harbour for terrorism. Military operations in Afghanistan have been led by NATO since 2003 and remains NATO's largest operation to date. This has been a priority for all NATO member nations who contribute troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there.<sup>2</sup>

ISAF was an ad-hoc organization, composed primarily of NATO members, formed to provide assistance to the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA). The ISAF's primary role was to help the Government of Afghanistan provide and maintain a secure environment to rebuild Afghanistan. ISAF has collaborated with non-governmental organizations and various United Nations agencies to aid in humanitarian operations, infrastructure repair, and emergency relief following natural disasters. Its support of the Afghan authorities was designed to allow the Afghans to take control and develop their own institutions and capabilities as quickly as possible. Joint patrols were conducted with the Afghan military and Kabul City Police, but in instances where raids and other operations where force was involved, ISAF only provided support, as to reaffirm its sole goal to assist local authority.<sup>3</sup>

Committees and sub-committees of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly persistently review developments and assess international efforts in the country. Delegations of Assembly members frequently meet with Afghan and NATO officials in order to determine progress achieved and remaining challenges within the nation. Through attendance at Assembly sessions, seminars, and programmes, the Afghan and Pakistani parliament members are able to exchange views with ISAF-contributing nations and are able to better understand NATO's structure, processes and

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/afghanistan>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/asia-pacific/athena.html>

policies. This contributes to improved mutual understanding and assists in strengthening the connections between the government of ISAF nations and those of Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>4</sup>

On February 29, 2020, after over a year of direct negotiations, the U.S. government and the Taliban signed a peace agreement that set the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Under this agreement,<sup>5</sup> the United States is set to draw its forces down to approximately 8,500 troops within 135 days and complete a full withdrawal within fourteen months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under their control from being used by terrorist groups, and also to enter negotiations with the Afghan government. Despite this new agreement, there has not been an official cease-fire put in place. Throughout 2019 and 2020, violence has continued across Afghanistan, prompting the United States to increase airstrikes and raids targeting the Taliban. Likewise, the Taliban has continued to carry out attacks on Afghan government targets, make territorial gains, and target Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) bases and outposts.<sup>6</sup>

Under the current circumstances, NATO is focused on the creation of enforcement mechanisms and insurance tactics for negotiations between Afghanistan and NATO member states. There are concerns over the displacement of Afghan civilians causing internal unrest, as well as exacerbating the European migrant crisis. Moreover, instability within Afghanistan has the potential to create even larger regional ramifications as Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia continue to compete with subnational actors for influence in Kabul. However, prospects for negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban have been further complicated with the Afghan government divided after a contentious election.<sup>7</sup>

## Timeline

**December 25, 1979:** The Soviet Red Army arrives in Afghanistan, marking the start of its 10-year occupancy. Afghan mujahideen fighters gather in Pakistan, financed by the U.S. to fight against communism.<sup>8</sup>

**Feb. 15, 1989:** After 10 years of occupation, the last Soviet soldier leaves Afghanistan.

**1992-1996:** Fighting among mujahideen warlords ensues after a power-sharing deal falls apart; after four years of conflict, much of Kabul is destroyed and nearly 50,000 people are killed.<sup>9</sup>

**1994:** The Taliban is formed from former mujahideen fighters, backed by the CIA and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence.

---

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/afghanistan>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/27/the-us-is-bombing-the-hell-out-of-the-taliban-as-munitions-dropped-reaches-nearly-10-year-high/>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan>

<sup>8</sup> <https://apnews.com/7011b5086a21f7f57c3cb218947742b2>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

**September 11, 2001:** A series of four coordinated terrorist attacks are launched on several targets in the United States, killing almost 3,000 people. This prompts the United States to invade Afghanistan and set Operation Enduring Freedom in motion. NATO engages in this fight against terrorism by launching its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area.<sup>10</sup>

**October 7, 2001:** Following the Taliban's refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden and close down terrorist training camps, the United States launches airstrikes against Al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan; ground forces are deployed two weeks later. This marks the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, supported by many allies, including NATO.<sup>11</sup>

**January 2002:** The first deputation of ISAF peacekeepers arrive in Afghanistan, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression). These mandates authorize ISAF to support the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA), the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), and the Government of Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup>

**January 31, 2006:** At a UNSC conference in London, the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan of peacebuilding, is launched. The Compact sets out a five-year agenda for sustained and prolonged engagement in Afghanistan in hopes of strengthening democratic institutions, controlling the illegal drug trade, stimulating the economy, enforcing the law, providing services to Afghan civilians, and protecting their human rights.<sup>13</sup>

**April 3, 2008:** At the Bucharest Summit, ISAF troop-contributing nations create a strategy for Afghanistan guided by four principles: shared long-term commitment, support for better Afghan leadership and responsibility, a civilian and military inclusive approach by the international community, and increased engagement and cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbours.<sup>14</sup>

**November 21, 2009:** Following decisions taken at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is officially implemented. Its aim is to coordinate efforts to train the Afghan forces.

**July 20, 2010:** The Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board is established as the mechanism to assess the readiness of districts and provinces to transition to Afghan lead for security. Afghan security forces and institutions are being trained, advised, and assisted by NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM).<sup>15</sup>

**May 1, 2011:** Osama Bin Laden is killed by US Special Operations Forces in Pakistan. Four others, including one of Bin Laden's sons, are also killed.

---

<sup>10</sup>[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm#:~:text=Collective%20defence%20means%20that%20an,attacks%20against%20the%20United%20States.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:~:text=Collective%20defence%20means%20that%20an,attacks%20against%20the%20United%20States.)

<sup>11</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)

<sup>12</sup><https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/asia-pacific/athena.html>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8641.doc.htm>

<sup>14</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

**November 24, 2013:** The *Loya Jirga*—the grand council of male representatives from different tribes and factions in Afghanistan selected by their local leadership<sup>16</sup>—votes in favour of a Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, imploring President Hamid Karzai to sign the deal immediately. The agreement governs the presence of US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 and enables thousands of US soldiers to stay in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF.<sup>17</sup>

**December 28, 2014:** ISAF completes its mission in Afghanistan. This concludes the 3-year transition period in which leadership of security was gradually transferred to the Afghans security forces; the Afghan security forces now have full security responsibility.

**January 1, 2015:** The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) is launched to continue to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF).

**July 12, 2018:** The heads of state and government of NATO and RSM troop-contributing partners meet with the Afghan president at the Brussels Summit. The importance of good and inclusive governance, institution building as well as social and economic development, is reiterated.<sup>18</sup>

**2018-19:** Donald Trump appoints Zalmay Khalilzad as a negotiator with the Taliban in hopes of fulfilling promises to bring American troops home. The U.S. intermittently engages in talks with the Taliban.

**Feb. 29, 2020:** The U.S. and the Taliban sign a deal in which the United States agrees to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan; the deal also paves the way for possible intra-Afghan talks in the future.<sup>19</sup>

## Historical Analysis

### Origins of the Afghanistan's Civil War

The entry of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979 prompted the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China to support the mujahideen. These mujahideen groups worked in favour of the Soviet's cold war rivals by fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the time the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked closely with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to bring foreign support for the mujahideen. In 1994, Mohammed Omar, a former mujahideen member, returned to Kandahar and formed the Taliban. The Taliban's name directly stems from the name of Mohammed Omar's followers, who were religious students, known as the *Talib*. These students sought to end warlordism through their strict adherence to Islamic law. By November 1994, the Taliban captured all of Kandahar Province. They refused the government's offer to join a coalition government and marched on Kabul in 1995.

On September 27, 1996, the Taliban seized Kabul and founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. This was only possible due to the military support by Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia. In August 1996, Osama bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan and arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He founded Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to support the mujahideen's war against the

---

<sup>16</sup> <https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79066>

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> <https://apnews.com/7011b5086a21f7f57c3cb218947742b2>

Soviets. By 2001, the Taliban had gained control of 80% of Afghanistan. It was later discovered by the 9/11 Commission in the United States that Al-Qaeda was also using Afghanistan as a place to train and indoctrinate fighters, import weapons, coordinate with other insurgent groups and plot terrorist attacks.

After the September 11 attacks, the United States carried out its own independent actions against the Taliban. NATO also agreed on a series of measures to support the United States in doing so. By the request of the United States, NATO launched its first anti-terror operation—Eagle Assist—from October 2001 to May 2002. This operation consisted of seven NATO radar aircraft which helped patrol areas over the United States. This was the first time that NATO's military assets were deployed due to the invocation of the Article 5 mutual defence clause. On October 26 that same year, NATO launched its second counter-terrorism operation—Active Endeavour. This mission induced NATO's Standing Naval Forces to begin patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean to monitor shipping. This was done to detect and deter terrorist activity, such as illegal trafficking. In March 2004, this operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.<sup>20</sup>

### **Mujahideen and the Taliban**

In the context of Afghanistan in the late 1900s, the mujahideen were groups of Islamic combatants that defended Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, which invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The mujahideen rose from local militias, led by regional warlords who independently fought against the Soviet invasion. Coordination among the different mujahideen factions was severely limited due to Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, linguistic differences, and traditional rivalries among ethnic groups. As the Soviet occupation continued on, the Afghan resistance became increasingly united in its opposition. By 1985, the majority of the mujahideen were fighting as part of a larger alliance due to the fact that they had only one main adversary, that being the Soviet government. This alliance was known as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen.<sup>21</sup>

The Taliban was formed in the early 1990s by Afghan mujahideen fighters with furtive backing by the CIA and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI). The movement attracted much support in the initial post-Soviet timeframe since it promised to improve stability and law enforcement after 4 years of conflict among rival mujahideen groups.<sup>22</sup> The original mujahideen of the 1980s and the Taliban utilize the same language of engaging in *jihad*—"holy war"—but the groups' two understandings of *jihad* are different. The largest difference between the original mujahideen and the Taliban is that the mujahideen waged a traditional type of *jihad*. The Taliban's conquering of Afghanistan in 1996, however, was far from traditional. Rather than pillaging and looting the villages which they seized, they searched the conquered populations' homes only to confiscate weapons.<sup>23</sup>

### **Counterinsurgency**

The military campaign named Operation Enduring Freedom began on Oct. 7, 2001, with a series of U.S. and British airstrikes against Taliban positions. Early in this conflict, the United States sent special military operations teams and agents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) into

---

<sup>20</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm)

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.thoughtco.com/the-mujahideen-of-afghanistan-195373>

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/background/taliban-afghanistan>

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/afghanistan-mujahideen-taliban>

Afghanistan, later joined by the U.S. Marines.<sup>24</sup> As a part of Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghan anti-Taliban forces, including an association called the Northern Alliance—a coalition of local militias—fought on the ground. In attempts to overthrow the Taliban, NATO special forces troops worked with the Northern Alliance, leading to various coordinated air and ground attacks.<sup>25</sup>

The U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan raised a number of important concerns regarding the future of NATO and the relationship between the United States and its transatlantic Allies. On September 12, 2001, NATO invoked Article 5, the mutual defence clause of the Washington Treaty. This invocation committed NATO aid in defending the United States against the perpetrators of the attacks. Shortly after, NATO sent seven of its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, crews, and ground support personnel to assist in the air defence of the United States. In addition to demonstrating NATO's military resolve and the political declaration of Article 5, the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft freed U.S. aircraft for use in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. NATO also provided air rights for U.S. aircraft, such as access to bases and ports, and other non-combat support.<sup>26</sup>

Since 2002, Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants have staged ambushes, planted explosives, carried out suicide bomb attacks, and used other guerrilla tactics against NATO and its Allies. Insurgents have also attacked Afghan and Pakistani politicians and other leaders who opposed their efforts. The insurgents favoured the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Although these explosives are often made by amateurs, they are powerful enough to destroy heavily armoured vehicles. As guerrilla attacks increase, the allied forces have placed more emphasis on counterinsurgency warfare, that being military action against guerrillas and other insurgents. The Allies have worked to convince Afghan civilians not to provide support to the insurgents. Through the 2000s, the counterinsurgency effort has required a large number of troops. Troops provide security for villages and perform humanitarian tasks such as digging wells, building schools and roads, and providing medical care.<sup>27</sup> In December 2009, the U.S. announced another surge in troops to be deployed in Afghanistan. By mid-2010, the United States had sent an additional 30,000 troops, bringing the American total to nearly 100,000. In addition to this, about 40,000 ISAF troops from other nations were serving in Afghanistan at that time. President Barack Obama argued that the surge would help end the war and prevent further attacks around the world.<sup>28</sup>

### **Ending the War**

In 2011, NATO began the gradual shifting of national peacekeeping and security leadership to Afghan forces. The transfer was complete in June 2013. By that time, Afghan security and military forces had been granted leadership over security operations for the entire country. International troops shifted into a supporting role. In February 2013, President Obama announced that the United States would end the war in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. He later announced that nearly 10,000 American troops would remain in Afghanistan until 2016, serving in such non-combat roles as training Afghan soldiers, advising Afghan army units, and helping maintain equipment. 7,000

---

<sup>24</sup> "Afghanistan War." *Funk & Wagnalls New World Encyclopedia*

<sup>25</sup>

<https://dema.az.gov/sites/default/files/Publications/AR-Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom-BORUNDA.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> [https://www.jstor.org/stable/43134050?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/43134050?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

troops from other NATO Allies and partner countries are also assisting the United States in doing so as part of RSM.<sup>29</sup> Despite these attempts, the United States, and the international community as a whole, have been unable to end the violence or hand off the war to the Afghan authorities, and the Afghan government cannot survive without external military backing.<sup>30</sup>

The US has continually failed to rebuild Afghanistan, as exemplified by the project to rebuild the Ring Road. The road would run 3,200 kilometres across Afghanistan, connecting the nation's four largest cities in hopes of uniting isolated communities across the country, bringing commerce, increasing security, and expanding the Afghan government's sphere influence. However, after 16 years, the \$3 billion that has been spent on the Ring Road has been squandered; the road remains largely unfinished and rapidly deteriorating.<sup>31</sup> Dozens of countries continue to provide assistance to Afghanistan, with 75% of the government's public expenditures currently covered by grants from international partners, according to a World Bank report. The report apprised that Afghanistan will continue to need billions in aid several years into the future. Some experts have noted that this aid could be used as leverage to maintain the occurrence of negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan government.<sup>32</sup>

In December, NATO and the United States formally ended their combat missions in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban increased its strength in Afghanistan in 2015, and security forces continued to battle the insurgents. In October 2015, Obama announced that U.S. troops would remain in Afghanistan into 2017.<sup>33</sup> In August 2017, President Donald Trump pledged to send at least 3,000 troops to Afghanistan. The additional forces brought the total of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to about 15,000. The deployed troops are on combat duty, a significant change from former President Obama's strategy to end troops' combat roles. In 2018, representatives of the United States and the Taliban began to hold talks on conditions under which U.S. troops might be withdrawn from the country.<sup>34</sup> The current agreements between the United States and the Taliban have led to the willingness of the Taliban to engage in talks with the Afghan government, ultimately improving the channel of intra-Afghan discussion.<sup>35</sup>

NATO countries have been encouraging of these negotiations and the progress made. The alliance believes that the deal will lead to a significant reduction in the alliance's enduring military presence in Afghanistan. "Recent progress on peace has ushered in a reduction of violence and paved the way for intra-Afghan negotiations ... to reach a comprehensive peace agreement,"<sup>36</sup> NATO Allies said in a statement. "In this context, the alliance and its partners in the Resolute Support Mission will implement conditions-based adjustments, including a reduction to our military presence,"<sup>37</sup> the statement added. NATO Allies now expect the beginning of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, with the possibility of a long-standing peace agreement that puts an end to violence.

---

<sup>29</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/how-good-war-went-bad>

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/1/11/16878056/afghanistan-us-fail-war-taliban>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/background/under/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war>

<sup>33</sup> "Afghanistan War." *Funk & Wagnalls New World Encyclopedia*

<sup>34</sup> *ibid*

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443>

<sup>36</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/taliban-peace-deal-world-reacted-200229165338513.html>

<sup>37</sup> *ibid*

## Other Powers

The Taliban initially formed in Pakistan in the 1990s following the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Many of its original members were Pashtuns who studied in Pakistani madrassas. After the U.S. invasion, Pakistan granted the Taliban safe havens and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which was thought to have some degree of control over the Taliban for years, provided military expertise and fundraising assistance.<sup>38</sup>

Moscow hopes to reconnect its ties to Afghanistan, as the two countries' relations became strained since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 following a decade-long occupation. Experts claim that Russia hopes to gain a leading role in the peace process and in order to grow influence in Afghanistan and counter the U.S. and NATO presence in the region. Recent attempts to do so has made the nation the host to several meetings between Taliban delegations and Afghan representatives.<sup>39</sup>

The Shiite majority in Iran has perpetually viewed the Taliban, a Sunni group, as its own rival, notably due to its received support from Iranian adversaries Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Opium addiction and drug trafficking are cases of the rampant problems between the two countries. In 2001, Iran accepted U.S. efforts to overthrow the Taliban and has also supported the Afghan government's actions in doing so since then. Iranian leaders have continued to acknowledge that the Taliban will likely maintain its long-standing influence in Afghanistan, so they have attempted to improve ties with the group.<sup>40</sup>

China's interests in Afghanistan are primarily economic, as it hopes to integrate it into the Belt and Road Initiative, a collection of development and investment projects. China is Afghanistan's largest source of foreign investment and it is interested in exploiting Afghanistan's vast natural resources to their own benefit. Additionally, Beijing is concerned about the possibility of terrorists utilizing Afghanistan to establish links within China. In 2019, Afghan and Taliban officials attended a conference in Beijing, it was then expressed that Chinese leaders are in support of a U.S.-Taliban agreement.<sup>41</sup>

## Past Action

From August 2003 to December 2014, NATO-led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandated by the UN. The aim of the ISAF mission was to provide assistance to the Afghan authorities in order to improve the Afghan national security forces' ability to provide effective security. At its peak, the ISAF force consisted of more than 130,000 troops from 50 nations, being NATO's longest recorded mission. ISAF has also contributed to extensive reconstruction and development in Afghanistan through 28 multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams.<sup>42</sup> ISAF has also assisted the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) through various security operations, in order to help the Afghan government reduce the possibility of insurgency. The largest priority of ISAF was to increase the capacity of the Afghan forces to take effective leadership. This became the

---

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war>

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war>

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)

main focus of the mission after 2011, as responsibility for security gradually transitioned to Afghan lead and ISAF shifted from a combat-centric role to a training, advising and assisting one.<sup>43</sup>

The effect of the mission on the Alliance has been positive in several respects. The substantial commitment offered to the campaign by NATO has caused non-US members of the coalition to suffer more than 1,000 combat fatalities. The alliance, in all, has spent billions of dollars in maintaining this commitment for more than 15 years.<sup>44</sup> ISAF helped create a secure environment for improving governance and socio-economic development, both being vital stipulations for sustainable stability. Over the decade of the ISAF mission, Afghanistan made the largest percentage gain in basic health and development indicators worldwide. Maternal mortality went down, life expectancy rose, and millions of people have exercised their right to vote in five election cycles since 2004—including the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections.<sup>45</sup>

NATO acts in a supporting role to the Afghan government and works in close coordination with other international partners, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the World Bank, the European Union and the development community. From the start of NATO's engagement in international efforts to help secure Afghanistan's future, NATO has also worked closely with many non-member countries. ISAF troop contributors included partners representing more than a quarter of UN member countries. This broad international support underlines the importance of the ISAF's mission and for the new Resolute Support Mission (RSM), as dedicated partner support continues.<sup>46</sup>

NATO launched RSM in January 2015 to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions. It numbers over 17,000 troops from 39 NATO Allies and partner countries. Countries not contributing troops to RSM are continually supporting this mission through the long-term effort to strengthen the sustainment of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). Beyond training, advice, and assistance, Allies and partner countries also contribute to the financing of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. By strengthening political consultations and practical cooperation in areas of specific interest, the mission enhances NATO's Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup> NATO and its operational partners agreed at the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels that they are committed to sustaining RSM until conditions indicate a shift in leadership is appropriate, to extend financial sustainment of the Afghan security forces through 2024, and to develop a political partnership with both the Afghan government and the Taliban.<sup>48</sup>

In the longer term, a traditional partnership with Afghanistan, in which each nation can contribute to improving the given situation on an equal basis, remains NATO's goal. The political leadership of NATO in Kabul takes the responsibility of advising Afghan authorities on the Enduring Partnership with NATO, as well as liaising with the government, civilians, and representatives of other nations. Recent progress has caused a decline in violence, paving the way for intra-Afghan negotiations.

---

<sup>43</sup>[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_69366.htm#:~:text=In%20support%20of%20the%20Afghan,capabilities%20of%20the%20Afghan%20forces.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm#:~:text=In%20support%20of%20the%20Afghan,capabilities%20of%20the%20Afghan%20forces.)

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan>

<sup>45</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> <https://rs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/key-facts-and-figures>

<sup>48</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm)

These negotiations between the fully inclusive Afghan national team and the Taliban would create the possibility of reaching a truly comprehensive peace agreement within the nation. In this context, adjustments will be made to RSM, including a reduced military presence, based on the conditions of certain regions and preparedness to transition leadership. Addressing Afghanistan's challenges requires a comprehensive approach, involving civilian and military actors, in aims of both providing sustainable security measures and promoting adequate governance.<sup>49</sup>

### **United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)**

United Nations activities are continually and predominantly focused on creating an environment to provide a solid foundation for sustainable peace and assistance for the Afghan people and Government. Currently leading this effort is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). This assistance mission was established by the UN Security Council in March 2002, as part of the Afghan Government through Security Council Resolution 1401. Since its creation, the Security Council has followed by extending the UNAMA's work until September 17, 2020. The mission supports reconciliation and of advancing regional cooperation to promote stable security, with an emphasis on the value of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned political process to do so.<sup>50</sup> UNAMA's main functions are served through Good Offices, Human Rights, Development Coherence and Regional Cooperation, including strategies to support political cohesion, well-organized elections, sustainable peace, alignment with Government priorities, human rights advocacy, and support to national human rights institutions.<sup>51</sup>

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in Brussels in 2016 saw Afghanistan receive many assurances of continued international assistance for its security and development needs. However, constant conflict in the country threatens the sustainability of Afghanistan's achievements. It seems that the only method for ending the conflict is through peace negotiations between the Afghan Government and the various armed opposition groups working against it. Of course, the various regions and the broader international community have important roles and a solid basis in helping to create the conditions for peace.<sup>52</sup>

### **Current Situation**

NATO is currently leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), a non-combat mission that provides training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. It includes approximately 16,500 personnel from both NATO and partner countries and operates with one central hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four separately functioning spokes in Northern, Western, Southern, and Eastern Afghanistan.<sup>53</sup>

The mission aims to support planning, budgeting, transparency, accountability, adherence to the principles of good governance, sustainment of processes, recruiting, training, and development of personnel. This has been attempted through the advising and assistance activities in support of the Afghan government's four-year security roadmap. Launched in 2017, this roadmap aims to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the Afghan national security forces and institutions. The

---

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unama>

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52060.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm)

mission performs supporting functions in leadership development, fighting capabilities, unity of command and fighting corruption.<sup>54</sup>

The legal basis of RSM is the formal invitation from the Afghan Government, as well as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between NATO and Afghanistan governing the presence of Allied troops. Resolute Support is also supported by the international community at large, which is reflected in the unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2189. This resolution welcomes the Resolute Support Mission, underscoring the importance of continued international support for the future stability of Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup>

As RSM continues to assist the Afghan security forces, there is a continued need to develop advisory teams to provide the Afghan government with effective and focused support. This calls on all Allies and partners to maintain engagement for regional and functional commands. The largest challenge for Afghanistan would be the creation of verifiable enforcement mechanisms in any post-negotiation scenarios. Concerns about the fate of women and children, specifically, are also issues that the Allies hope to address outside of sustainable security. Moreover, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Afghan civilians has swelled the ranks of refugees fleeing the country, as well as displaced millions more internally. While Kabul has pledged to take full budgetary responsibility by 2024, the economic trends and socio-political difficulties suggest that it is unlikely.

<sup>56</sup>

Prior to the rise of the Taliban, women in Afghanistan made important contributions to national development and were increasingly given more rights. Before the Taliban imposed severe restrictions on women's ability to work, Afghan women had been active in humanitarian relief organizations. The Taliban claimed these restrictions were imposed to ensure women had a safe and dignified role in society. However, it is observed that women were stripped of their dignity under the Taliban. Under Taliban rule, girls are deprived of basic healthcare and schooling. Public concern for Afghan women and girls has grown immeasurably in the international community. The detrimental effects of Taliban policy on women have been studied by numerous nongovernmental organizations to raise public awareness. With this knowledge, NATO is fighting in favour of a more representative government, which includes women, in post-Taliban Afghanistan.<sup>57</sup>

Several aspects of the Afghanistan War became the subject of much public debate. One such aspect was the use of drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's). UAVs are utilized for surveillance and attack missions that can be deemed highly dangerous for human pilots. However, many critics oppose the use of drone attacks. Particularly controversial is the shadowy nature of the U.S. drone program: determining criteria for carrying out drone strikes has been the exclusive province of the president and a small group of lawyers and advisers. Additional controversy stemmed from the use of drones in regions where allied forces were not authorized. The U.S. and allied air teams repeatedly used drones to attack targets they believed to be Taliban and Al-Qaeda strongholds in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis opposed the use of drone strikes in their country. The UN and other international organizations have estimated that thousands of Afghan civilians have been killed by allied airstrikes—both by drones and piloted aircraft—during the course of the war. The

---

<sup>54</sup> <https://rs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/key-facts-and-figures>

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47733079>

<sup>57</sup> <https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/6185.htm>

killing of Afghan civilians has contributed to criticism of the United States and caused tension between U.S. and Afghan leaders. Airstrikes and drone strikes also increase the chance of civilian casualties, which provides insurgents with the opportunity to portray the attacks in a way that supports their recruitment efforts through the spreading of false information to surrounding villages after local civilian casualties take place. After a decade and a half of an unrelenting information operations campaign by the insurgents, the anti-American, or more broadly anti-foreign mindset, is unavoidable to most Afghan civilians.<sup>58</sup> However, the UN has noted that a vast majority of the civilian deaths in the war have been caused by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.<sup>59</sup>

### **Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2)**

As part of national and international efforts to intercept lines of illegal trafficking and migration in the Aegean Sea, SNMG2 was placed in the Aegean Sea as mandated by the North Atlantic Council. NATO has contributed to international efforts to assist with the refugee and migrant crisis as a result of the current situation in Afghanistan. Since February 2016, NATO ships have been conducting reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance of illegal crossings within the Aegean. NATO ships have been collecting valuable information that has been used by both the Greek and Turkish Coastguards and by Frontex—the EU’s border management agency—to aid in intercepting the migrant boats first sighted by NATO.<sup>60</sup>

### **Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework (GMAF)**

The Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework, outlining the reform objectives and commitments for the Government of Afghanistan and the international community was adopted by the United Nations Security Council for 2019 and 2020. The framework highlights that the Government’s delivery of the agreed commitments will be key for continued international support. The Security Council acknowledged and reaffirmed its previous commitment to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process with the participation of women, also agreeing that the international community is committed to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan, including in the economic sphere. Also noted is the need to further improve regional cooperation overall, including the political, security, economic and social, to the benefit of the whole region.<sup>61</sup>

## **Possible Solutions**

### **Reconciliation and Reintegration**

Securing reconciliation or settlement agreements with Taliban insurgents will require inducements to insurgents to put down their arms in a manner that does not alienate those members of the population that have remained loyal to the Afghan government. While some of the reintegration will likely happen organically at the local level, this approach may also require centralized government intervention. To create circumstances most conducive for negotiations, the international community must maintain military and social pressure on the Taliban while simultaneously providing viable, attractive, and feasible alternatives for those choosing to abandon the group. Due to the somewhat fractured nature of the Taliban, NATO countries could choose to apply a methodical and targeted approach by pressuring the Taliban in designated areas

---

<sup>58</sup><https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/24/afghanistan-western-cure-worse-than-taliban-disease/#790291e2156b>

<sup>59</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan>

<sup>60</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_70759.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm)

<sup>61</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13612.doc.htm>

with greater susceptibility to government influence, while pursuing reconciliation efforts. Campaigns to increase social pressure on individual Taliban leaders to pursue peace could reap large benefits by creating a persuasive degree of social pressure on local Taliban targets to force reconciliation.<sup>62</sup>

The large demographic of former insurgents, along with Afghanistan's burgeoning youth bulge, creates the potential prospect of multiple new waves of social instability and radicalization. Concurrent investments in economic and human capital development are necessary for preventing future insurgency or expanded criminal activity for the youth population and former insurgents. Creation of regionally-oriented programs that simultaneously supports local infrastructure development, provides immediate work opportunities to former Taliban members and teaches basic skills to foster future employment and counter potential extremism might fit the bill. These programs should be mainly geared toward youth in order to implant national identity, provide job opportunities, build life skills, encourage political engagement, and foster hope for the future.<sup>63</sup>

### **Afghanistan Narrative and Influence Operations**

The basis for progress in Afghanistan will be set on the foundation of the Afghan government's ability to mobilize the population through influence tactics. Changing Afghan perceptions and political outlooks will require a long-term, coordinated, and strategic approach that works alongside words and actions to create a unified narrative for Afghanistan. To further improve these narrative and influence operations, NATO should empower Afghan-led messaging that leverages Islam and culture to bolster education. Information operations against the Taliban can also be synchronized with broader strategic goals.<sup>64</sup>

### **The Transition of Roles in Afghanistan**

Most importantly, NATO needs to continue shifting ownership of the mission to its Afghan partners, to avoid the continuation of current issues in the future. Failure to encourage Afghan independence and legitimate governance will result in Afghanistan remaining reliant upon foreign presence and support beyond the Resolute Support Mission. More specifically, NATO will have to reconsider its deployed structure, organization, and roles to appropriately address changes in the environment. As the situation improves, troop numbers may decrease, and each nation must determine how it will help accomplish updated objectives. The Afghan government needs to create conditions upon which external regional cooperation is also a possibility. Regional partnerships increased interoperability, and improved regional security can be encouraged through initiatives leveraging the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). The path to the end of the conflict in Afghanistan will be political and it will be in the hands of the Afghans and may involve fundamental reframing of foreign policy as we move forward.<sup>65</sup>

In the instance that NATO chooses to conduct and maintain the status quo indefinitely, NATO would be keeping about 13,000 troops in Afghanistan who are training and advising government forces, and participating in combat. Participation in combat by NATO forces is even more limited

---

<sup>62</sup><https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/getting-peace-right-in-afghanistan-a-political-solution-to-a-military-problem/>

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

now than before and new rules of engagement restrict offensive operations against the Taliban. The Taliban remain the most active on the battlefield of all insurgent groups and now hold more territory than ever due to these reasons. Growing territorial control has become excessively dangerous for soldiers, who must wait like sitting ducks until the Taliban attack. Afghan security forces are also displeased by the current situation as NATO forces usually do not provide assistance when the Taliban attack. As a result, they have been frequently deserting and surrendering, including handing over their weapons and vehicles to the Taliban.<sup>66</sup>

Should NATO increase troops by several thousand, or shift to air support, it is still unlikely that NATO may overpower the Taliban. The situation would be similar for airstrikes as well. In January 2016, the U.S. carried out 128 weapons drops in Afghanistan. Even if NATO increased those weapons drops to the tempo of over 400 per month, as in January 2011, it is unlikely that NATO would win this “air war.” While airstrikes in Syria and Iraq work against fixed income-generating resources like oil wells and massed troops that could take a capital or front-line, they do not work against an insurgency as in Raqqa or Afghanistan. Herbicides against opium fields in Afghanistan may substantially reduce the Taliban’s monetary support, however, this was never initiated, likely for political reasons in Kabul.

Complete withdrawal has the possibility of being disastrous for Afghanistan, both in political and humanitarian aspects. The Afghan security forces could likely crumble, as government forces did in Iraq. The Taliban and ISIS would have the freedom to kill thousands of Hazaras, a Shia minority. Afghanistan could turn into a vehemently anti-Western state, similar to Iran in 1979. But, all of this could happen even if NATO were to keep a few thousand troops in the country. The likelihood of negative outcomes could even increase in the instance of an increase in U.S. military presence; airstrikes have a similar effect on the Afghanistan public. A 2008 study indicated that this public opinion of the U.S. is strongly correlated with NATO bombing campaigns, as the Taliban utilizes these airstrikes as an opportunity to vilify NATO.<sup>67</sup> Ultimately, the transition of roles to the Afghan government is ill-advised under the current circumstances, causing NATO to require a more comprehensive approach to the situation.

## Bloc Positions

### Western European Bloc

This bloc implores the Afghan government and the Taliban to reduce violence and release prisoners in order to pursue additional confidence-building measures between each other. In good faith, these actions will create the conditions for a start to intra-Afghan negotiations and lead to sustained peace. It is important for these countries that any political settlement must protect the rights of all Afghans, including women, young people and minorities.<sup>68</sup> As well, this bloc calls upon all states to provide their full support to promote the successful negotiation of a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement that ends the war and contributes to regional and global security. These nations advocate for an immediate reduction in violence and underscored the role to be played by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) going forward. In addition, this bloc has expressed its readiness to review the status of individuals and groups designated in the sanctions established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), “mindful that Taliban

---

<sup>66</sup><https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/24/afghanistan-western-cure-worse-than-taliban-disease/#790291e2156b>

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14139.doc.htm>

action, or the lack thereof, to further reduce violence, make sustained efforts to advance intra-Afghan negotiations, and otherwise cease to engage in or support activities that threaten the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, will affect the review.”<sup>69</sup>

### **North American Bloc**

The United States uses the bilateral Afghanistan Compact and the multilateral Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework (GMAF) to hold the Afghan Government accountable to the mutually agreed reform commitments. The United States currently focuses its development assistance on promoting peace, self-reliance, and stability through various programs aimed to increase economic growth. In doing so, the U.S. hopes to create an export-oriented trade strategy, strengthen the capacity of civilian institutions, ameliorate the justice system, and maintain the gains made over the last decade in health, education, and women’s rights.<sup>70</sup> Most of the current US budget has gone towards building up Afghan security forces, such as the Afghan National Army and police force, while the remaining has been spent on improving governance and infrastructure, economic and humanitarian aid, and anti-drug initiatives.<sup>71</sup>

Further, Canada strives to explore and further strengthen the development, diplomacy, and defence within Afghanistan. Canada’s continued engagement in Afghanistan is based on lessons learned from its past involvement, including proven models and effective approaches from experiences with ISAF and RSM. This bloc believes that greater attention to drawing lessons on development programming and good practices in civilian-military cooperation from Afghanistan and other fragile state involvements, as well, mechanisms to ensure retention would be highly beneficial. While each mission is unique and approaches should be developed accordingly, it is clear to Canada that important efficiency gains could be realized if knowledge were preserved, maintained and built upon.<sup>72</sup>

### **Mediterranean Bloc**

This bloc is focused on assisting with the growing refugee and migrant crisis in Europe, seeing it as a security crisis, as they are the nations most affected by the current issue. NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) was deployed in the Aegean Sea and has since conducted reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings.<sup>73</sup> NATO's Standing Naval Forces were also deployed to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean as part of Operation Active Endeavor. This was done mainly to monitor shipping in order to detect and deter illegal trafficking and the operation was later expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.<sup>74</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/>

<sup>71</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821>

<sup>72</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/derec/canada/summative-evaluation-canada-afghanistan.pdf>

<sup>73</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_128746.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm)

<sup>74</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm)

## Works Cited

- “The 1980s Mujahideen, the Taliban and the Shifting Idea of Jihad | Nushin Arbabzadah.” *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 28 Apr. 2011, [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/afghanistan-mujahideen-taliban](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/afghanistan-mujahideen-taliban).
- ABC News, ABC News Network, [abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79066](http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79066).
- “Afghanistan.” *NATO PA*, [www.nato-pa.int/content/afghanistan](http://www.nato-pa.int/content/afghanistan).
- “Afghan Conflict: US and Taliban Sign Deal to End 18-Year War.” *BBC News*, BBC, 29 Feb. 2020, [www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443).
- Al Jazeera. “Taliban-US Agreement: How the World Reacted.” *News / Al Jazeera*, Al Jazeera, 29 Feb. 2020, [www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/taliban-peace-deal-world-reacted-200229165338513.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/taliban-peace-deal-world-reacted-200229165338513.html).
- Azami, Dawood. “Afghanistan War: What Could Peace Look like?” *BBC News*, BBC, 14 July 2019, [www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47733079](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47733079).
- Corr, Anders. “Afghanistan: Western Cure Worse Than Taliban Disease.” *Forbes*, Forbes Magazine, 25 Feb. 2016, [www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/24/afghanistan-western-cure-worse-than-taliban-disease/#790291e2156b](http://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/02/24/afghanistan-western-cure-worse-than-taliban-disease/#790291e2156b).
- Defence, National. “Government of Canada.” *Canada.ca*, 11 Dec. 2018, [www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operati ns/asia-pacific/athena.html](http://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operati/ns/asia-pacific/athena.html).
- Ellis, Sam. “How the US Failed to Rebuild Afghanistan.” *Vox*, Vox, 11 Jan. 2018, [www.vox.com/world/2018/1/11/16878056/afghanistan-us-fail-war-taliban](http://www.vox.com/world/2018/1/11/16878056/afghanistan-us-fail-war-taliban).
- “Getting Peace Right in Afghanistan: A Political Solution to a Military Problem.” *Atlantic Council*, 20 Aug. 2019, [www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/getting-peace-right-in-afghanistan-a-political-solution-to-a-military-problem/](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/getting-peace-right-in-afghanistan-a-political-solution-to-a-military-problem/).
- Malkasian, Carter. “How the Good War Went Bad.” *Foreign Affairs*, 16 Apr. 2020, [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/how-good-war-went-bad](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/how-good-war-went-bad).
- Nato. “Assistance for the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the Aegean Sea.” *NATO*, 22 Apr. 2016, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_128746.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm).
- Nato. “Collective Defence - Article 5.” *NATO*, 18 May 2020, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm).
- Nato. “ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived).” *NATO*, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_69366.htm#:~:text=In%20support%20of%20the%20Afghan,capabilities%20of%20the%20Afghan%20forces](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm#:~:text=In%20support%20of%20the%20Afghan,capabilities%20of%20the%20Afghan%20forces).
- Nato. “NATO and Afghanistan.” *NATO*, 14 July 2020, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm).
- Nato. “Operations and Missions: Past and Present.” *NATO*, 11 June 2018,

[www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52060.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm).

*NATO Resolute Support | Key Facts and Figures*, [rs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/key-facts-and-figures](https://rs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/key-facts-and-figures).

Press, The Associated. "A Timeline of Key Events in Afghanistan's 40 Years of Wars." *AP NEWS*, Associated Press, 29 Feb. 2020, [apnews.com/7011b5086a21f7f57c3cb218947742b2](https://apnews.com/7011b5086a21f7f57c3cb218947742b2).

"Security Council Press Statement on Geneva Afghanistan Conference | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." *United Nations*, United Nations, [www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13612.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13612.doc.htm).

"SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSES FIVE-YEAR 'AFGHANISTAN COMPACT' AIMED AT BOLSTERING SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." *United Nations*, United Nations, [www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8641.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8641.doc.htm).

"Security Council Welcomes Significant Steps towards Ending War in Afghanistan, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2513 (2020) | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." *United Nations*, United Nations, [www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14139.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14139.doc.htm).

Seth Johnston | Autumn 2019, et al. "NATO's Lessons from Afghanistan." *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, [www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan](http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/natos-lessons-afghanistan).

Snow, Shawn. "The US Is Bombing the Hell out of the Taliban as Munitions Dropped Reaches Nearly 10-Year High." *Military Times*, Military Times, 27 Jan. 2020, [www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/27/the-us-is-bombing-the-hell-out-of-the-taliban-as-munitions-dropped-reaches-nearly-10-year-high/](http://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/27/the-us-is-bombing-the-hell-out-of-the-taliban-as-munitions-dropped-reaches-nearly-10-year-high/).

Szczepanski, Kallie. "Who Were the Afghan Mujahideen?" *ThoughtCo*, [www.thoughtco.com/the-mujahideen-of-afghanistan-195373](http://www.thoughtco.com/the-mujahideen-of-afghanistan-195373).

"Afghanistan War: What Has the Conflict Cost the US?" *BBC News*, BBC, 28 Feb. 2020, [www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-47391821).

"A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan." *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan](http://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan).

"U.S. Relations With Afghanistan - United States Department of State." *U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State, 8 July 2019, [www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/](http://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-afghanistan/).

"U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What to Know." *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war](http://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/us-taliban-peace-deal-agreement-afghanistan-war).

"UNAMA | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs." *United Nations*, United Nations, [dppa.un.org/en/mission/unama](http://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unama).

"War in Afghanistan | Global Conflict Tracker." *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan](http://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan).

"What Is the Taliban?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, [www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/taliban-afghanistan](http://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/taliban-afghanistan).

# Nuclear Arms Control

## Questions to Consider

1. How can NATO prevent non-state actors from procuring the means to create or distribute dangerous nuclear materials?
2. How can the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be improved to be more effective in all nations, including those outside of NATO?
3. How can NATO ensure and maintain effective nuclear deterrence?
4. How can NATO improve collective security in regards to the possession and distribution of nuclear weapons?

## Overview

Since NATO Allies put forward the first NATO Disarmament Proposal in London in 1957, active policies in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have been a vital part of NATO's commitment to security and stability.<sup>75</sup> Though the alliance itself is not party to any treaties, NATO supports and facilitates dialogue among members nations, partners and other countries to ensure proper implementation of international obligations. Various NATO member nations are parties to international agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT has furthered global goals of nuclear disarmament since its establishment in 1970. As part of the treaty, a number of safeguards have been put in place under the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to verify treaty compliance.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, the CFE Treaty created equal limitations on major armaments for NATO Allies as well as Warsaw Pact nations. The Treaty also provided storage facilities for weapon systems that are not currently in active units.<sup>77</sup> NATO cooperates closely with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and other organizations and initiatives to address proliferation issues in the field of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<sup>78</sup>

Though NATO is committed to its goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons, the alliance has made it clear that “as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”<sup>79</sup> However, the alliance aims only to maintain its defence obligations through the use of both nuclear and conventional forces. The nuclear weapons that NATO members possess have been reduced by more than 90% since the height of the Cold War, and the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defence systems has been dramatically reduced. The alliance remains committed to creating conditions for which even further reductions can be possible, understanding that progress toward disarmament and non-proliferation must be considerate of the international security environment.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48895.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48895.htm)

<sup>76</sup> <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/#:~:text=The%20NPT%20is%20a%20landmark,and%20general%20and%20complete%20disarmament.>

<sup>77</sup> <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/>

<sup>78</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48895.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48895.htm)

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

NATO Allies also continue to emphasize their commitments to fully implement each aspect of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. For 50 years, the NPT has been the foundation of global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, playing an essential role in the maintenance of international peace, security and stability. On the 50th anniversary of the NPT on March 5, 2020, the alliance issued a statement asserting the allies' "resolve to seek a safer world for all, and to take further practical steps and effective measures to foster nuclear disarmament."<sup>81</sup> Through statements like these, the organization stresses the unique role of the treaty and "call on all States to enhance efforts to achieve universal adherence and universalization, and effectively combat nuclear proliferation through full implementation of the NPT."<sup>82</sup> NATO Allies continue, stating that they "support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, in an ever more effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all."<sup>83</sup>

NATO Allies have also been strongly in favour of preserving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. However, NATO was shocked by the discovery that Russia breached its obligations under the INF Treaty and called upon Russia to urgently return to standard compliance. Russia, however, continued to deny this Treaty violation. As a consequence, on February 1, 2019, the United States suspended its obligations under the INF Treaty, with the withdrawal officially in effect in August of 2019, six months later. During this six month period, Russia denied its Treaty violation, and despite years of US and Allied engagement, continued to develop and deploy the SSC-8/9M729 missile system, violating the agreement. Consequently, member nations generally agree that Russia "bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty."<sup>84</sup> To ensure that the Alliance's deterrence and defence remains credible and effective, NATO has agreed to a balanced, coordinated, and defensive package of measures despite the failure of the INF.<sup>85</sup>

## Timeline

**August 29th, 1949:** Four years after the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities, the Soviet Union performs its first nuclear weapon at a test range in Kazakhstan. This is surprising since most U.S. assessments had estimated Moscow was at least three years away from obtaining the technology.<sup>86</sup>

**November 1st, 1952:** Concern spreads that U.S. nuclear superiority is being challenged by Moscow. The newest generation of nuclear weapons, known as thermonuclear devices, or hydrogen bombs, are developed. On November 1, 1952, the United States tests the first of these hydrogen bombs. The blast from the explosion is roughly seven hundred times the force of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. Moscow tests its first hydrogen bomb in November 1955.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control>

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

**October 4, 1957:** Two months after testing the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile, the Soviet Union launches Sputnik 1, the first man-made satellite to be sent into space, marking the start of the space race. This era of space exploration launches a new period of apprehension over fallout from nuclear testing.<sup>88</sup>

**July 29, 1957:** The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is established in Vienna as a forum for international cooperation on civilian nuclear research. The IAEA's statute outlines its mission of creating verifiable nuclear safety, security, and technology transfer.<sup>89</sup>

**July 1, 1968:** The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is signed on July 1, 1968. The treaty recognizes the five existing nuclear-weapons states at the time: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty gives signatories the right to civilian nuclear technology in accordance with IAEA safeguards but prohibits the acquiring of nuclear weapons.<sup>90</sup>

**December 8, 1987:** The United States and the Soviet Union sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). This is the first treaty signed to reduce nuclear arms that introduces comprehensive verification measures. In the treaty, Gorbachev and Raegan agree to eliminate ground-launched, mid-range nuclear missiles. In a shocking shift from Gorbachev's Reykjavik posture, he agrees to de-link the INF from broader strategic talks.<sup>91</sup>

**November 9, 1989:** The fall of the Berlin Wall marks the beginning of the end of the Cold War, leading to rapid progress on disarmament efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) is signed two years later by U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. This treaty limits the number of warheads possessed by the United States and Russia to approximately 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles each. The two nations plan to reduce their nuclear stockpiles to below 6,000 warheads by December 2009.<sup>92</sup>

**December 22, 2010:** The U.S. Senate approves the New START, the first arms control agreement to be approved by Congress since the 2002 Moscow Treaty. Obama calls New START "the most significant arms control agreement in nearly two decades." The Russian parliament approves the treaty in early 2011.<sup>93</sup>

**July 7, 2017:** The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is adopted by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The treaty prohibits participation in any and all nuclear weapon activities, including the development, testing, possession, stockpile, use, production, acquisition, or threat to use nuclear weapons.<sup>94</sup>

**August 2, 2019:** Due to Russian violations, President Donald J. Trump pulls the United States out of the INF Treaty with support from NATO member states. Russia continues to deny its possession of a

---

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/>

prohibited cruise missile. Some believe the end of the treaty could serve as the catalyst for a new nuclear arms race.<sup>95</sup>

## Historical Analysis

### Nuclear Arms Race

The Cold War marked a period of exceptional tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Due to their extremely different economic and political beliefs, the divide between these two states was vast throughout the second half of the 20th century. While the Soviet Union practiced communism, the United States promoted freedom and capitalism. This ideological difference pitted the superpowers directly against each other. Consequently, this stewed competition in the development of new technology and military weapons, the most notable being the nuclear bomb.<sup>96</sup> The two nations competed for superiority in the development and accumulation of nuclear weapons. As such, the US spent six trillion dollars on its nuclear weapons program, which contained ten thousand nuclear warheads. On the other hand, Russia had only half as many. Although the arms race was meant to increase each state's security, it backfired in several instances, namely, the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.<sup>97</sup> The Suez Crisis was brought upon by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's declaration of the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. This proclamation caused Britain, France, and Israel to respond in a forceful manner through the deployment of troops in the area. The crisis was averted when President Eisenhower pressured Britain and France to accept a UN ceasefire.<sup>98</sup> The Cuban Missile Crisis was prompted by the implantation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, which instigated a response from the United States government, claiming that "U.S. forces would seize offensive weapons and associated material that Soviet vessels might attempt to deliver to Cuba."<sup>99</sup> The lack of communication between nuclear powers nearly led to armageddon.

### Post-Cold War Reductions

The United States deployed approximately 7,300 nuclear weapons in Europe at the height of the Cold War, which provided extended deterrence and security guarantees to NATO Allies.<sup>100</sup> Today, the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe in support of NATO has been reduced by 90% since the end of the Cold War. Since the enactment of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, the subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991, and the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in 2002, there has been a gradual trend of nuclear weapons reductions between the U.S. and Russia.<sup>101</sup> Marking the first agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear arsenals, the INF Treaty required the two superpowers to permanently eliminate all cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometres as well as nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic missiles.<sup>102</sup> START defined basic terms for limitations on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), heavy (long-range) bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for each side.<sup>103</sup> The 10-year SORT required the

---

<sup>95</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control>

<sup>96</sup> <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/nick2/>

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>

<sup>99</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/event/Cuban-missile-crisis>

<sup>100</sup> <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html>

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>

<sup>103</sup> <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1>

United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads respectively.<sup>104</sup>

The most significant reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe, which was completely unprompted by an arms control treaty, took place in September 1991.<sup>105</sup> This was the most significant reduction of tactical nuclear weapons to date within the European theatre and was brought upon by a series of Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) by U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. They announced changes in policy which declared that the United States and the Soviet Union would reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and delivery vehicles in their arsenals.<sup>106</sup> This prompted the U.S. to destroy a large portion of its nuclear artillery and the cancellation of the planned modernization of several nuclear systems. Subsequently, Soviet leaders pledged to eliminate all nuclear warheads, nuclear land mines, and nuclear artillery. By 2010, Russia had dramatically reduced the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons by storing away all of its strategic nuclear weapons in central facilities in Russia and had removed tactical nuclear weapons from its ground forces.<sup>107</sup>

These actions resulted in a significant reduction in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and the eased military tensions between the U.S. and Russia and brought about arguably the most transformative change to the nuclear posture in Europe. Unfortunately, these gains were not sustained and were not followed up with verifiable progress in dismantling stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons. While the United States gradually reduced its nuclear forces over time, Russia's proper implementation of such commitments have been doubted, mainly due to the fact that these political statements did not include any compliance or insurance mechanisms.<sup>108</sup>

### **Maintaining Effective Nuclear Deterrence**

Noting the continuously transforming security environment, NATO has strived to deter nuclear threats and respond to nuclear use in order to safeguard the security of those that live under the alliance's jurisdiction. NATO's member states' governments have agreed that the alliance's nuclear weapons are kept only with the intention to "preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression."<sup>109</sup> The reassurance of these claims can be found with the reiteration of the transatlantic commitment of collective security, most significantly demonstrated by the alliance's nuclear sharing arrangements. With these arrangements in place, European and North American allies equally share the risks and responsibilities of nuclear deterrence. NATO aims to continually review and ensure the effectiveness of its deterrence tactics and defence capabilities by ensuring that its nuclear stockpiles remain safe, secure, and effective.<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>104</sup> <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance>

<sup>105</sup> <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html>

<sup>106</sup> [https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/presidential-nuclear-initiatives/#::~:~:text=In%20September%20and%20October%201991,\(TNW\)%20and%20delivery%20vehicles.](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/presidential-nuclear-initiatives/#::~:~:text=In%20September%20and%20October%201991,(TNW)%20and%20delivery%20vehicles.)

<sup>107</sup> <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html>

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

## Past Action

The United Nations has aimed to eliminate the dangers associated with nuclear weapon ownership since its initial establishment. This has been attempted through the creation of several multilateral treaties and governing groups created in hopes of preventing proliferation and testing while promoting disarmament. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).<sup>111</sup> NATO adopted the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament in May 1989, which was one of the alliance's agreements that strived for arms control and eventual disarmament. It served as a foundation for the alliance's agreements regarding nuclear arms and set up guiding principles and objectives for NATO's policies in nuclear, conventional, and chemical arms control. As well, the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament clearly defined the correlations and connections between arms control and defence policies, establishing an overall conceptual framework from which the Alliance sought to progress its arms control agenda.<sup>112</sup>

NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces in the present-day security environment. However, the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty posed a severe threat, primarily to European peace and security, and serves as a great detriment to the chances of maintaining nuclear security control in the world. The U.S. has also noted its intention to leave the Open Skies Treaty, which allowed Russia and western nations to conduct observation flights over each other's territory, which served as a crucial accountability measure. Further, if the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is not renewed in 2021, there will no longer be any nuclear arms agreements established directly between Russia and the United States, subsequently allowing for a lower barrier in terms of limits on the size of their nuclear arsenals. The dangerous prospect of a new nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia is a reality that the world may soon come to face. Such a race would have lasting and cascading effects on other nuclear states as well as countries who may feel inspired to break from the status-quo in order to pursue their own nuclear ambitions.<sup>113</sup> Countries without nuclear weapons are currently sheltered under the "nuclear umbrella," in which nuclear states promise to defend non-nuclear powers in the case of a nuclear strike.<sup>114</sup> As such, even countries without nuclear weapons can also receive the benefit of nuclear deterrence.

All nuclear powers would need to cooperate in order to reduce, and eventually eliminate, their nuclear stockpiles. This includes NATO member states, who have also declared an interest in more sizable and expeditious disarmament. The American State Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation plans to convene a set of multilateral working groups with 20 to 30 countries each to "identify aspects of the real world security environment that present major obstacles to further disarmament movement and to develop specific proposals for how those obstacles might be overcome."<sup>115</sup> A working paper presented by the United States at the Spring

---

<sup>111</sup><https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20has%20sought,of%20atomic%20energy%20among%20others.>

<sup>112</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48895.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48895.htm)

<sup>113</sup>[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/20091022\\_Nuclear\\_Forces\\_in\\_the\\_New\\_Security\\_Environment-eng.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_Nuclear_Forces_in_the_New_Security_Environment-eng.pdf)

<sup>114</sup> <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-05-29-nato-npt-frameworks-caughley-afina-2.pdf>

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

2018 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) meeting listed several conditions from the treaty that they were dissatisfied by. It can be argued that a new path is necessary in the face of current geopolitical tensions unfavourable in disarmament progress.<sup>116</sup>

## Current Situation

### Recent Challenges

Recent nuclear reductions are evidently slowing significantly. Between 2009 and 2013, the United States nuclear weapons stockpile decreased by only 309 warheads, significantly less than the 3,287 in the preceding five-year period.<sup>117</sup> Although Russia has not published official nuclear stockpile numbers, it is estimated that the country has only retired approximately 1,000 warheads in the same time period, compared to around 2,500 warheads in the preceding five-year period. Rather than the intended rapid decrease, the world's largest nuclear stockpiles appear to be levelling out.<sup>118</sup> The United Kingdom has not declared additional stockpile numbers since a statement in 2010 that claimed its stockpile would not exceed 225 warheads and will shrink to 180 by the mid-2020s.<sup>119</sup> Since 2008, France has not disclosed any projections of its nuclear arsenal and appears to also be rejecting additional reductions. China has not made any announcements since its declaration in 2004 that it possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear weapons states in the NPT and actually seems to be increasing its nuclear arsenal.<sup>120</sup>

In 2014, nearly five decades after the NPT's initial implementation, and more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, the world's nine nuclear-armed states continue to possess an estimated 16,400 nuclear warheads combined. To put this into perspective, this would be enough to arm every nation on Earth with 85 nuclear weapons.<sup>121</sup> The P5, the five nuclear-weapon states in the NPT, possess more than 98% of the world's nuclear weapons, and despite growing nuclear arsenals in countries outside the NPT, the responsibility of reducing the world's nuclear weapons is given to the P5.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, more than 93% of the world's nuclear weapons belong to the former Cold-War superpowers of Russia and the United States. The nations' warhead inventories are still roughly 25 times larger than that of France, the third-largest nuclear-armed state. Even at the current growth rate, the two fastest-growing nuclear arsenals in the world —Pakistan and India—would take 760 years to reach the size of the arsenals of Russia and the United States.<sup>123</sup> The disproportionate size of the Russian and US arsenals indicates that they are solely influenced by each other rather than other nuclear-armed states, perhaps signifying that the sizes of their current stockpiles are only an indication of how far the Cold War arms race has progressed. Should Russia and the United States reduce their warhead inventories, it would put a significant pressure on the other nuclear-armed states to limit their nuclear arsenals as well.<sup>124</sup>

---

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> <http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=11&sid=23a0b0b4-4845-4d12-946a-42d3fdb87256%40pdc-v-sessmgr01>

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

## Russia

In recent years, in order to counter what it perceives as NATO's superiority in conventional military strength, Russia has chosen once again to rely on nuclear weapons deployed in the European theatre. Russia has modernized approximately 80% of its strategic nuclear forces since the early 2000s as part of its overall military transformation.<sup>125</sup> Due to these upgrades, Russia is currently better prepared to add new nuclear warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers when treaty-imposed constraints from New START (2010) expire between 2021 or 2026.<sup>126</sup> In response, the United States has begun to embark on its own 20+ year modernization programme, including extending the life of the B61 gravity bombs deployed to Europe for NATO's nuclear sharing mission to "ensure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons without exception."<sup>127</sup> These actions in particular are quite significant with regards to the minimal progress on negotiating a new arms control treaty before New START ends.

Russia is also in the process of developing, testing, and fielding a variety of new missile systems, such as the strategic-range hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard and the theatre-range Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile.<sup>128</sup> Russia also claims that its newly-developed air-launched ballistic missile, the Kinzhal, will have a range of about 2,000km. These hypersonic weapons have the ability to fly at extraordinary speeds, low altitudes, and have the capability to maneuver during flight. This combination of capabilities is what makes tracking hypersonic missiles highly difficult and defence against them nearly impossible. The United States' late start to investing in hypersonic missile system development is the largest reason why its nuclear arsenal is currently considered to be inferior to Russia's.

Russia is in the process of developing "novel" nuclear systems such as a nuclear-powered nuclear cruise missile and an underwater unmanned nuclear torpedo in addition to hypersonics. These innovations would result in Allies having little advanced warning in case of a nuclear attack and thus reduce their ability to respond effectively. Such systems have the possibility of being used to intimidate, coerce and attack NATO Allies, though Russia's rationale for the development of these weapons remains unclear. At this point in time, it would be sensible for NATO to assess the ability of its own capabilities with the possible threat of these new Russian systems.<sup>129</sup> The field of tactical, non-strategic nuclear weapons, including lower-yield nuclear warheads—such as air-, sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles—seems to be the largest discrepancy between NATO and Russia's military power. Russia's current stockpile of missile systems are designed to be capable of both conventional or nuclear weapons delivery. Having these two capabilities means that these systems can reach the territory of all of NATO Europe either from land, sea or air. Russia's 1500 to 2000

---

<sup>125</sup> <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html>

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50068.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm)

<sup>128</sup> <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html>

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

non-strategic nuclear warheads, in comparison to the 150 to 200 of the United States', is why Russia now poses a renewed challenge to NATO's regional deterrence.<sup>130</sup>

### **North Korea, Pakistan, Iran**

North Korea is on the verge of a strategic breakout, both with its quantitative increase of warheads— assumedly 100 weapons by 2020—and qualitative proficiency in warhead miniaturization. Most concerning, however, is the country's lack of hesitance in selling nuclear materials to virtually any nation. As Pyongyang is known for its "willingness to sell anything they have to anybody who has the cash to buy it," it can be reasonably assumed that they would use their nuclear prowess for profit, regardless of consequences.<sup>131</sup> Pakistan continues to build up its nuclear arsenal through its development of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons. This is mainly due to the current tensions between India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan faces an internal security threat of radical Islamists attempting to infiltrate its nuclear establishment. These groups are often able to use nuclear weapons as tools for increasing political influence. Iran's access to nuclear weapons is another threat to NATO. However, the 2015 nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the world's major powers will block Iran's pathways to a weapon or weapons-usable material for at least 15 years.<sup>132</sup> Unfortunately, in 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump abandoned the deal and subsequently reinstated sanctions targeting both Iran and states that trade with it. This led to an economic downturn in Iran, causing the value of its currency to plummet to record lows, drove away foreign investors, increasing inflation by four times the annual rate, and triggered protests.<sup>133</sup> However, it also gives Iran an incentive to restart its nuclear program.

### **Non-State Actors**

The most effective strategies in preventing non-state actors from being able to create or distribute nuclear weapons would be those that lockdown weapons and weapons-usable material. Though this accumulation of nonproliferation strategies would not completely eliminate non-state terrorist threats, it would go far in achieving the goal against non-state actors. Deterrence by denial has been the consistent approach, in terms of nonproliferation, to counter nuclear terrorism falls. Specific actions to do this include exporting controls to limit access to technology and physical security at sensitive sites, essentially to perform the main task of better securing fissile material and prevent illicit diversion.<sup>134</sup> The United States has employed deterrence by punishment to prevent the transferring of nuclear weapons or technologies to terrorist groups. The United States has continually confirmed its policy that any nation that supports or enables terrorist groups to acquire or use nuclear weapons should be held fully and solely accountable.<sup>135</sup> However, this policy of calculated ambiguity seems inadequate for North Korea, currently the only known state that may be compelled to sell weapons or nuclear technologies to terrorist groups. To address the threat posed by North Korea, NATO should make it explicit to North Korea that any purposeful consignment of nuclear weapons or systems by North Korea to a non-state entity would trigger a severe and widespread response from the international community.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> <https://www.lawfareblog.com/preventing-nuclear-911-state-based-strategies-deter-non-state-threats>

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655>

<sup>134</sup> <https://www.lawfareblog.com/preventing-nuclear-911-state-based-strategies-deter-non-state-threats>

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

## Possible Solutions

### Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)

In 2013, the United Nations reported 140 missing or illegally-used radioisotopes, which are unstable elements that can be used to construct radiological weapons such as RDDs, also referred to as “dirty bombs.” Components of RDDs include conventional explosives, detonation apparatuses, and radioisotopes. Due to the simplicity of design, the capability of creating a dirty bomb is accessible even to those with limited technical knowledge. Unlike conventional explosive blasts, the largest danger of dirty bombs is the inhalation of radioactive debris. This will create a stochastic health threat, leading to carcinogenesis months to years later, manifesting long after exposure. These nuclear devices are often used by non-state actors rather than governments due to their inability to fund a proper nuclear program. However, these RDDs can be extraordinarily deadly if used properly. Therefore, it is important for NATO to note the importance of improving radioisotope accountability, tracking, and security measures. By doing so, Allies can ensure the prevention of radiological attack opportunities for violent non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or other criminal organizations.<sup>137</sup>

### Nuclear Terrorism

There are two plausible methods for a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear weapon: stealing an intact nuclear weapon or acquiring the raw materials needed to create their own nuclear bomb. Because of the small amount of nuclear material required to build a bomb, most terrorists have the capability to steal enough material to create one or more bombs. Many opt for this method, as there are numerous faults in the current security systems along with numerous stockpiles of nuclear weapons materials.<sup>138</sup>

NATO Allies are in agreement that a proper strategy to reduce relevant risks is the most important factor in addressing potential nuclear terrorism. This can firstly be done by better ensuring control of all fissile material, such as through the destruction of excess fissile material from dismantled weapons. Further, collective security is needed in order to effectively limit the amounts of fissile material that can be easily stolen. At the moment, the international community is lacking on both fronts. There are still large excesses of fissile material that has failed to be disposed of, mainly in the Russian Federation. The threat of nuclear terrorism will continue should nuclear states fail in their effort to control and dispose of fissile material.<sup>139</sup>

### Non-Proliferation Treaty

It has been continually made clear by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation that states should reduce their nuclear arsenals to the minimum possible level. However, due to fears of losing nuclear deterrence, countries are often unwilling to reduce their arsenals due to fear of losing second-strike capability, the ability to strike back with nuclear

---

<sup>137</sup><https://pandorareport.org/2014/04/17/dirty-bombs-an-enigma-of-identity-and-non-use/#:~:text=Surprisingly%2C%20they%20are%20rare.,nuclear%20weapons%20are%20often%20conflated.>

<sup>138</sup> <https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/nuclear-terrorism-overview>

<sup>139</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/next-steps-universal-nuclear-disarmament>

weapons and cause massive damage to an enemy even after being struck first by a nuclear attack.<sup>140</sup> Further, the current salience of nuclear weapons in military planning serves to hamper the goals of non-proliferation. De-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons in military planning internationally can result in a lesser need for WMDs. Beyond the accepted distinctions and exclusions between nuclear and non-nuclear states as defined by the NPT, fairness and non-discrimination should be the key to the safe preservation and improvement of the non-proliferation regime.<sup>141</sup>

There is an urgent need to revisit the safeguards and constraints placed on the production of fissile material in order to improve the collective security in nuclear affairs. More stringent international controls on the production of fissile material for civilian use must be established. Though new ideas have been put forward by the IAEA in regards to this, more developments are needed in regards to the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. For instance, IAEA membership could be more universalized and the NPT can be revised to apply to more countries.<sup>142</sup>

In terms of violations of the NPT, any infringement should be met with harsh sanctions aimed to reverse and deter further disobedience. Further, countries can revoke the civilian benefits derived from NPT membership, and in extreme cases, use military force. It is only when sanctions are unfair, when the credibility of global justice is low, or when alleged violations become mixed with other political or strategic controversies, that problems arise around non-compliance arise. Long-term and large-scale sanctions are generally less effective, as countries tend to readjust their economies to reduce the effectiveness of sanctions. Therefore, the improvement in the efficacy of sanctions may be a point of discussion. Further, isolation as a result of prolonged sanctions has the possibility of fostering excessively nationalistic attitudes and increases the likelihood of certain nations being further cut off, political or economically, from the international arena. In fact, authoritarian regimes tend to be strengthened by isolation and sanctions if there is a domestic determination to build nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.<sup>143</sup>

## Bloc Positions

### United States

In the eyes of many U.S. officials, recapitalization, also known as “modernization,” of America's strategic nuclear capability is critical in the upcoming years. The U.S. hopes to achieve this recapitalization through the replacement and overhaul of existing weapons with new weapons or ones that are re-equipped with improved technology. During the next 20 years, the highest point of this recapitalization of the nuclear force will comprise about 3.7% of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget.<sup>144</sup> This year's request to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise comprises about 1.2% of the total DOD budget request.<sup>145</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability>

<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1801797/4-things-to-know-about-the-us-nuclear-deterrence-strategy/>

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

America's missiles are located on land, on submarines, and in fighter planes, making up the three portions of "the nuclear triad."<sup>146</sup> Ground-based Minuteman III weapons, submarine-launched Trident II missiles, and an array of nuclear bombs designed to be delivered by aircraft are among the weapons included within the triad. To ensure proper operation and retain deterrent capability, officials claim that these weapon systems must be modernized.<sup>147</sup> As well, the U.S. must invest in its systems to maintain parity against China and Russia, who are prioritizing high levels of defence spending to modernize their own nuclear forces.<sup>148</sup>

The U.S. seeks to strengthen deterrence by fixing the imbalances within its nonstrategic nuclear systems and differentiating it from Russia's. This strategy will ensure that Russia, China, and others will be deterred from using low-yield nuclear weapons against the U.S. or other NATO Allies. Investment in these capabilities will not require nuclear testing, do not violate arms control treaties, and will effectively strengthen deterrence through the overall prevention of conflict.<sup>149</sup> Due to the United States' withdrawal from the INF treaty, it is now exploring conventional ground-based intermediate strike missiles.<sup>150</sup>

### **Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Netherlands**

This bloc consists of the hosts of American nuclear weapons as part of the current NATO nuclear sharing policy. Although the nature of threats has changed since the end of the Cold War, some of the benefits remain the same for keeping the nuclear agenda consistent.<sup>151</sup> Most fundamentally, the governments of these nations see the nuclear deterrent as fundamental to the maintenance of European security. Recently, these nations have spoken of "taking responsibility for their own security,"<sup>152</sup> pursuing an enhanced role in the arms control discussions through the possession of their own nuclear arms. In this way, these nations are attempting to bridge the difference between their commitments and interests in disarmament and nonproliferation and their perceived security needs.

### **Sweden, Norway, France and Switzerland**

In regards to the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), several nations have expressed interest in ratifying the TPNW, but only in the case that fellow NATO member-states will also follow in ratifying the Treaty. Until recently, NATO members have historically rejected being party to the TPNW. These shifts in ideals reflect growing global concern about Trump's irresponsible talk on using weapons of mass destruction against North Korea.<sup>153</sup> For a NATO member, joining the TPNW would pose considerable political problems for its membership of the alliance, due to the fact that NATO is a nuclear alliance, therefore challenging that nation's political obligations.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> <https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/getting-out-of-the-nato-nuclear-task-would-not-increase-dutch-security/>

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> [https://www.icanw.org/italian\\_parliament\\_instructs\\_italy\\_to\\_explore\\_possibility\\_of\\_joining\\_the\\_nuclear\\_ban\\_treaty\\_tpnw](https://www.icanw.org/italian_parliament_instructs_italy_to_explore_possibility_of_joining_the_nuclear_ban_treaty_tpnw)

<sup>154</sup> <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-05-29-nato-npt-frameworks-caughley-afina-2.pdf>

## United Kingdom, France

In relation to nuclear policy, both France and the UK have emphasized the importance of strengthening international legal norms of non-proliferation: they have both ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and are in support of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Neither London or Paris is known to consider “counterforce” nuclear options, this strategy being to target an opponent's military infrastructure with a nuclear strike. Both countries have claimed a minimum deterrence policy, largely due to the limited availability of resources to support demanding nuclear missions and systems.<sup>155</sup> To this bloc, recent progress in conventional precision munitions and missile defence has made it nearly impossible to further downgrade the role of nuclear deterrence.<sup>156</sup>

## Works Cited

“4 Things to Know About the U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy.” *U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE*, [www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1801797/4-things-to-know-about-the-us-nuclear-deterrence-strategy/](http://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1801797/4-things-to-know-about-the-us-nuclear-deterrence-strategy/).

Afina, Yasmin, and Tim Caughley. *NATO and the Frameworks of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Challenges for the 10th NPT Review Conference*. [www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-05-29-nato-npt-frameworks-caughley-afina-2.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-05-29-nato-npt-frameworks-caughley-afina-2.pdf).

Authors Eli Corin Research Assistant. “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control.” *Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a Safer World*, 1 Mar. 2004, [www.nti.org/analysis/articles/presidential-nuclear-initiatives/#:~:text=In%20September%20and%20October%201991,\(TNW\)%20and%20delivery%20vehicles](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/presidential-nuclear-initiatives/#:~:text=In%20September%20and%20October%201991,(TNW)%20and%20delivery%20vehicles).

Cox, Jessica. “Nuclear Deterrence Today.” *NATO Review*, Nato Review, 8 June 2020, [www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html).

Domstad, Julia. “Dirty Bombs: An Enigma of Identity and Non-Use.” *The Pandora Report*, 18 Apr. 2014, [pandorareport.org/2014/04/17/dirty-bombs-an-enigma-of-identity-and-non-use/#:~:text=Surprisingly%20they%20are%20rare.,nuclear%20weapons%20are%20often%20conflated](http://pandorareport.org/2014/04/17/dirty-bombs-an-enigma-of-identity-and-non-use/#:~:text=Surprisingly%20they%20are%20rare.,nuclear%20weapons%20are%20often%20conflated).

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Cuban Missile Crisis.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 4 Feb. 2020, [www.britannica.com/event/Cuban-missile-crisis](http://www.britannica.com/event/Cuban-missile-crisis).

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Secure Second Strike.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 27 May 2018, [www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability](http://www.britannica.com/topic/second-strike-capability).

“Fact Sheets & Briefs.” *START I at a Glance | Arms Control Association*, [www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1](http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1).

“Fact Sheets & Briefs.” *The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance | Arms Control Association*, [www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty](http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty).

---

<sup>155</sup> [https://www.sciencespo.fr/cefi/files/art\\_bt.pdf](https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr/cefi/files/art_bt.pdf)

<sup>156</sup> *ibid*

- “Fact Sheets & Briefs.” *The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At a Glance | Arms Control Association*, [www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance](http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance).
- “Getting Out of the NATO Nuclear Task Would Not Increase Dutch Security.” *War on the Rocks*, 9 Dec. 2019, [warontherocks.com/2019/12/getting-out-of-the-nato-nuclear-task-would-not-increase-dutch-security/](http://warontherocks.com/2019/12/getting-out-of-the-nato-nuclear-task-would-not-increase-dutch-security/).
- “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details.” *BBC News*, BBC, 11 June 2019, [www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655).
- “Italian Parliament Instructs Italy to Explore Possibility of Joining the Nuclear Ban Treaty.” *ICAN*, [www.icanw.org/italian\\_parliament\\_instructs\\_italy\\_to\\_explore\\_possibility\\_of\\_joining\\_the\\_nuclear\\_ban\\_treaty\\_tpnw](http://www.icanw.org/italian_parliament_instructs_italy_to_explore_possibility_of_joining_the_nuclear_ban_treaty_tpnw).
- Nato. “Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in NATO.” *NATO*, 22 May 2020, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_48895.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48895.htm).
- Nato. “NATO's Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Forces.” *NATO*, 11 May 2020, [www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50068.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm).
- “NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment.” *NATO*, [www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/20091022\\_Nuclear\\_Forces\\_in\\_the\\_New\\_Security\\_Environment-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_Nuclear_Forces_in_the_New_Security_Environment-eng.pdf).
- “Next Steps to Universal Nuclear Disarmament.” *United Nations*, United Nations, [www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/next-steps-universal-nuclear-disarmament](http://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/next-steps-universal-nuclear-disarmament).
- Nuclear Arms Race During the Cold War*, [large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/nick2/](http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/nick2/).
- “Nuclear Terrorism Overview.” *Union of Concerned Scientists*, [www.ucsusa.org/resources/nuclear-terrorism-overview](http://www.ucsusa.org/resources/nuclear-terrorism-overview).
- “Nuclear Weapons – UNODA.” *United Nations*, United Nations, [www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20has%20sought,of%20atomic%20energy%20among%20others](http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20has%20sought,of%20atomic%20energy%20among%20others).
- “Preventing a Nuclear 9/11: State-Based Strategies to Deter Non-State Threats.” *Lawfare*, 30 Jan. 2020, [www.lawfareblog.com/preventing-nuclear-911-state-based-strategies-deter-non-state-threats](http://www.lawfareblog.com/preventing-nuclear-911-state-based-strategies-deter-non-state-threats).
- “The Suez Crisis, 1956.” *U.S. Department of State*, U.S. Department of State, [history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez](http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez).
- Tertais, Bruno. *A COMPARISON BETWEEN US, UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR POLICIES AND DOCTRINES*. [www.sciencespo.fr/cei/sites/sciencespo.fr.cebri/files/art\\_bt.pdf](http://www.sciencespo.fr/cei/sites/sciencespo.fr.cebri/files/art_bt.pdf).
- “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).” *Nuclear Threat Initiative - Ten Years of Building a*

*Safer World,*

[www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/](http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-conventional-armed-forces-europe-cfe/).

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA.” *United Nations*, United Nations,  
[www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/#:~:text=The%20NPT%20is%20a%20landmark,and%20gneral%20and%20complete%20disarmament.](http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/#:~:text=The%20NPT%20is%20a%20landmark,and%20gneral%20and%20complete%20disarmament.)

“Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – UNODA.” *United Nations*, United Nations,  
[www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/](http://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/).

“U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations,  
[www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control](http://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control).